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    Statement on USG .xxx Intervention Gains Support | Log in/Create an Account | Top | 100 comments | Search Discussion
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    Changes Coming to New IP Stack Code in .NET Engine
    by Anonymous on Sunday September 04 2005, @04:53AM (#16181)
    Changes Coming to New IP Stack Code in .NET Engine

    The .NET Engine *filters* IP address space as a
    default, it has to be explicitly told what ranges
    to open for routing. Current IP stacks passs
    allow everything in, including terrorists, and
    then attempts to fight them off once allowed in.

    The New IP Stack Code in the .NET Engine has a
    16-address Golden Address Cache with 16 addresses
    that are considered to be root-addresses that are
    never blocked or filtered. That helps to prevent
    devices from being completely shutdown by
    filtering themselves off the .NET.

    When nodes join the WIFI or WIMAX mesh they can
    easily learn what is in other node's Golden
    Address Caches. Some nodes cache the addresses
    of the 2 .COM and 2 .NET servers that are close
    to them. Those are not root-server addresses.
    Those are also only 4 of the 16 addresses.
    The .COM and .NET servers are cached in their
    64-bit address form, with Port Number that
    indicates they are DNS servers, as opposed to
    web servers.

    The nodes have a preference to cache 2 addresses
    from the Civilian 10.X.X.X channel and the
    Military 11.X.X.X channel. They scan their WIFI
    and WIMAX signals and lock in on the best signals.

    The nodes do not know anything about .ORG, ICANN
    or RIRs. They are able to power-up and join the
    .NET [in New Orleans] without top-down permission
    from FEMA, the governor of .LA, CNN, FOX, or
    even the Mayor of New Orleans. The nodes are
    really dumb, they just like to connect and attempt
    to stay connected. Survival is their priority.

    Read the code, not the .NEWS
    [ Reply to This | Parent ]
    Re:Changes Coming to New IP Stack Code in .NET Eng
    by Anonymous on Sunday September 04 2005, @05:20AM (#16182)
    DHT - Distributed Hash Table code is also now being
    put into the IP stack. All of the 16 Golden Addresses in the cache are expected to be DHT servers.

    The DHT key is 160 bits.

    Names from the 4-bit character set (that has DOT)
    are mapped on to the 160-bit key field. That allows
    for 40 character domain names, including the dots
    and the TLDs and even a dot at the right if that
    floats your boat.

    DHT is an approach where your node sends out
    a GET using a 160-bit Key and back comes one
    or more 512 byte blocks that have been stored
    via that Key. The 160-bits LOOK like IP address
    headers with or without bad checksums. They
    can be stealthed in via IP-in-IP and look like
    an IP header. [Note: NANOG thugs attempt to
    block them.]

    The 160-bit KEY is often created by taking
    your THREE MAC addresses which are 48 bits each.
    Add some DOTs between the addresses and you
    have a UNIQUE key with 8 bits left to have some
    room in case of collisions.

    With DHT you do a PUT into the .NET and your
    512 bytes are cached and replicated. Others can
    go a GET and read your 512 bytes if they use
    the same KEY.

    Illiterate people think the 160-bit KEY is an
    IP header and attempt to play their games with
    it. They can not imagine how a 40 character
    domain name can be used to derive the KEY.
    40 times 4 is 160. Duh

    Route around the NANOG thugs. The U.S. telcos
    are in New Orleans and have agreed not to play
    games with packets, such as black-holing done
    by ARIN Trustees.
    [ Reply to This | Parent ]


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