Two things are clear: 1) some kind of a new "multistakeholder" policy entity will be proposed, or at least put forward as an option, and 2) governments want a bigger role for themselves, though it is not clear how carefully that potentially dangerous option will be handled.

In order to shed light on the latter question, this piece takes attitudes toward the ICANN's GAC as a useful indicator of how various players are positioning themselves on the question of governments in internet governance, and compiles comments from and leading up to the latest WGIG meeting.

Speaking for a group of African states, a representative from Ghana called for the creation of "AN ADDITIONAL BODY WHICH WOULD NOT ONLY SERVE AS A MULTISTAKEHOLDER DISCUSSION FORUM BUT ALSO PROFFER POLICY ADVICE IN A PARTICIPATORY MANNER. [snip] THIS BODY WOULD ADDRESS ALL ISSUES RELATING TO THE INTERNET WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE AVAILABLE EXPERTISE WHICH WOULD BE ANCHORED AT THE U.N." The African group agreed with IGP that this new oversight body obviated the need for a GAC: "THE GENERAL CONSENSUS WAS THAT THE PROPOSED NEW BODY SHOULD NOT ONLY TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENTAL OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS OF THE DNS AND ROOT SERVER SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION BUT ALSO OTHER AREAS OF ACTIVITY UNDER THE OVERSIGHT OF THE USG. THIS OVERSIGHT FUNCTION THROUGH THIS NEW BODY SHOULD NOT ONLY BE APPLICABLE TO ICANN AFTER THE TERMINATION OF THE MOU IN 2006 BUT ALSO POST 2006. THIS NEW BODY SHOULD ALSO REPLACE THE GOVERNMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE [OF ICANN] AND TAKE OVER ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACTIVITIES." Editors note: all caps due to the transcription method of WGIG.

The government of India made similar comments. "ON THE CURRENT DISPENSATION, IT DOES NOT APPEAR POSSIBLE TO ENVISAGE AN OVERSIGHT FUNCTION FOR GAC … (INAUDIBLE). THE ADVISORY FUNCTION FOR GAC, WHICH IT HAS SO FAR DISCHARGED ADMIRABLY, WOULD BE SUBSUMED BY THE PROPOSED ENTITY OF MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDERS MENTIONED ABOVE, ALBEIT WITH POWERS OF DECISION-MAKING AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION. THE SPECIFICITY OF SUCH FUNCTIONS WILL NEED TO BE FURTHER ELABORATED TO AVOID AMBIGUITY AND OVERLAP WITH OTHER AGENCIES. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT IT WILL BE IN THE INTEREST OF ALL, AND PARTICULARLY FOR PROPER INTERNET GOVERNANCE, IF SUCH NEW MECHANISM CAN BE PUT IN PLACE EVEN BEFORE 2006."

Interestingly, vested stakeholders in the current ICANN regime, such as the Number Resources Organization and the International Chamber of Commerce, called for continuing GAC's current position. Similarly, the Internet Governance Task Force of Japan, which consists of ISPs and Internet technical people, said "WE THINK THE CURRENT GAC SHOULD NOT BE TRANSFORMED AND TAKE ON OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS. ACCORDING TO THE ICANN BYLAWS THE CURRENT GAC IS DESIGNED AS THE PART OF ICANN'S CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT PROCESS AND THEREFORE IT HAS FUNCTIONED AS A PLACE FOR GOVERNMENT PARTICIPANTS TO EXCHANGE THEIR OPINIONS FREELY IN THE BOTTOM-UP ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE. WE FIND A GREAT VALUE IN THE CURRENT POSITION OF GAC, AND THUS IT SHOULD NOT BE TRANSFORMED TO TAKE ON OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS. THIS IS IN LINE WITH ANSWERS TO NEXT QUESTIONS, SHOULD THE GAC BE REPLACED BY ANOTHER BODY. AGAIN, OUR ANSWER IS NO; WE THINK THE GAC FUNCTIONS WELL UNDER THE CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS."

All of which raises an interesting question: which method limits and contains national governments' power and which methods further empowers governments - abolishing GAC and removing it from ICANN's day-to-day workings, but giving governments a higher, supervisory role, or Keeping GAC embeded within, and increasingly influential within, ICANN itself?

Doesn't reply to my http request. You just make this stuff up and I'm the only one stupid enough to fall for it. -g